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Abstract
The rise of China in the world economy and in international trade has raised the
possibility of a rise of the Yuan as an international currency, particularly after the
Chinese authorities have undertaken policy initiatives such as Yuan settlement and
Yuan swap lines. In this paper, we measure one dimension of Yuan internationali-
sation: the role of the Yuan in the exchange rate arrangements of other economies.
While the magnitudes are small, our ndings show that as many as 34 currencies
in the world have been sensitive to movements in the Yuan. This suggests that the
Yuan potentially has a signicant role to play in global exchange rate arrangements.
Contrary to popular belief, however, we nd a limited role of the Yuan among Asian
economies.
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21 Introduction
There are two mechanisms through which China's exchange rate policy can have spillovers
upon the policy choices of other economies. First, economies which compete with China in
export markets may be averse to appreciation against the Yuan. Second, economies that
are part of the Asian production network may have an incentive to lower bilateral exchange
rate volatility against the Yuan, to the extent that their rms are engaged in international
transactions denominated in Yuan. This second class of motivations has been highlighted
in recent years, with Chinese initiatives on Yuan settlement, Yuan swap lines and Yuan
denominated bonds that aim to establish the Yuan as an international currency.
In this paper, we trace the role of the Yuan in exchange rate arrangements worldwide since
July 2005. In this setting, we ask three questions. First, has there been a role for the
Yuan in worldwide exchange rate arrangements? Second, has there been a particularly
important role for the Yuan in exchange rate arrangements in Asia? Third, what has been
the magnitude of the role of the Yuan? In the rst two cases, we test the null hypothesis
of no-eect, and in the third, we measure the magnitude of the relationship.
This work is important in understanding the role of China in the world economy, the
new phenomenon of Yuan internationalisation, the evolution of exchange rate arrangments
among emerging markets and developing economies, and the Asian production network. It
yields a measure for one dimension of Yuan internationalisation: its role in the exchange
rate regime outcomes of other currencies.
One additional dimension which motivates this work lies in the extent to which Chinese
appreciation is important for global rebalancing. The Chinese current account surplus
is 0.74 per cent of world GDP. Even if a substantial appreciation took place in China,
it would have a relatively modest impact upon global aggregate demand. If, however, a
Chinese appreciation encouraged or enabled many other economies to also appreciate, then
the overall impact upon global aggregate demand would be larger. Thus, if we nd that
the Yuan has come to play a signicant role in global exchange rate regimes, there is a
greater importance of Yuan exchange rate regime reform for global rebalancing.
We use the exchange rate regression, where percentage changes in an exchange rate against
a numeraire currency are regressed on changes in the dollar, the pound, the yen and the euro
(Haldane and Hall, 1991; Frankel and Wei, 1994; Frankel, 2009). We focus on the period
from October 2005 to February 2011, a period in which there have been modest changes in
the CNY/USD rate. A natural extension of this model would involve an additional CNY
regressor. However, weekly changes in the CNY/CHF rate have a correlation coecient of
0.988 against the USD/CHF rate. Hence, we construct a time-series (dlog(CNYo=CHF))
by extracting the autonomous movement of the Chinese exchange rate, that is, independent
of movements in the USD/CHF rate.
This regression suers from the problem of structural change, either owing to changing
policies on the part of authorities in a country, or owing to changes in external shocks.
3We draw on recent developments in the econometrics of structural change in the exchange
rate regime in order to obtain a set of break dates of structural change (Zeileis, Shah, and
Patnaik, 2010). This permits estimation of the coecient of the CNYo in each sub-period.
An analysis of 132 currencies reveals 375 periods in global exchange rate arrangements.
Of these, there are 85 instances with a statistically signicant role for the autonomous
movements in the Chinese exchange rate. These reveal an interesting picture of the foot-
print of Chinese exchange rate policy, including large developing economies (e.g. India
during Oct-2005 to Mar-2007), many economies in Africa, strategic allies (e.g. Pakistan
from Dec-2007 to Nov-2008) and even one OECD country (Israel between Oct-2005 and
Dec-2007).
Turning to East Asia, there are three periods where there was a statistically signicant
CNYo coecient: Malaysia (from 2005 to 2007), Viet Nam (after 2009) and Taiwan (all
through). Barring these three periods, the remainder of East Asia has not exhibited
dependance upon China's exchange rate arrangement.
We turn to the examination of GDP-weighted mean of the CNYo coecient in order to
ascertain the economic signicance of the footprint of Chinese exchange rate policy. At a
global level, we nd a small value in the years 2006 and 2007. However, from early 2008
onwards, Chinese exchange rate policy has not in
uenced global exchange rate arrange-
ments. Similar results hold when analysing the group of emerging markets and developing
economies: Here there is a marginally stronger value in 2006 and 2007. Again, from early
2008 onwards, the null hypothesis of no role for the Chinese Yuan cannot be rejected.
In Asia, the role of Chinese exchange rate policy in its exchange rate arrangment is absent
through most of the post-2005 experience, other than a short period during the crisis where
we obtain a point estimate of 0.03 with a 95% condence interval running from 0.01 to
0.07.
These results suggest that while China has made enormous strides in terms of achieving
a major role in international trade, in establishing Yuan settlement mechanisms and in
establishing Yuan swap lines to many economies, there is relatively limited evidence of the
emergence of the Yuan as an international currency in one key dimension: The role of the
Yuan in the exchange rate regime arrangement of other economies. The average Asian
country appears to appreciate by roughly 0.05 per cent when China appreciates by 1 per
cent.
A surprising result is the footprint of the Chinese Yuan well beyond Asia. If these economies
care about Chinese exchange rate 
exibility, to the extent of their revealed preferences, a
larger autonomous movement of the Yuan can play a signicant role on global exchange
rate arrangements in the future.
4Table 1 China's bilateral currency swap agreements as of Jan'11
Country Date Maturity Amount Renewable
Korea 12-Dec-2008 3 yrs 180bn Yuan X
38tn Won
Hong Kong 20-Jan-2009 3 yrs 200bn Yuan X
227bn HKD
Malaysia 08-Feb-2009 3 yrs 80bn Yuan X
40bn Ringgit
Belarus 11-Mar-2009 3 yrs 20bn Yuan X
8000bn Belarusian ruble
Indonesia 23-Mar-2009 3 yrs 100bn Yuan X
175tn Rupiah
Argentina 30-Mar-2009 3 yrs 70bn Yuan X
38bn Peso
Iceland 10-Jun-2010 3 yrs 3.5bn Yuan X
Singapore 24-Jul-2010 3 yrs 150bn Yuan X
30bn Singaporean Dollar
Source: Xinhuanet, ASEAN, HKMA.
2 Motivation
With 30 years of high growth rates of imports and exports, China has emerged as a major
part of international trade. In merchandise trade, China is the world's largest exporter and
the second largest importer. Through this rise to prominence on the international stage,
Chinese exchange rate policy has come to matter beyond China.
How might Chinese exchange rate policy matter to other economies?
In many less developed economies (LDCs) and emerging markets (EMs), governments
have hindered exchange rate 
exibility. One motivation for this `fear of 
oating' lies in
concerns about export competitiveness. To the extent that a country competes against
Chinese exports, a Chinese appreciation would tend to improve export competitiveness,
and reduce the resistance to 
exibility. Through this mechanism, China's policy choices
on the exchange rate could have eects beyond China. Pontines and Siregar (2010) point
out the role of the Chinese Renminbi in the attempts in East and Southeast Asia to avoid
appreciation.
In recent years, Chinese authorities have embarked on a set of policy initiatives that could
potentially result in certain kinds of Yuan internationalisation: Relaxing restrictions on
Yuan deposits in Hong Kong, issue of Yuan-denominated bonds by Chinese and Foreign
companies in Hong Kong, trade settlement for Chinese companies in Yuan and currency
swap agreements with foreign central banks.
Since December 2008, swap lines worth about 800 billion Yuan have been put in place. The
5timing of such agreements suggest that the Chinese authorities could have been concerned
about the global disruption of trade nancing at that time. However, such lines were ar-
ranged with economies such as Belarus, Argentina and Iceland, which are not important
trading partners to China. The intention to internationalise the Yuan became more pro-
nounced when trade settlement for companies in ve Chinese cities with counterparties in
Hong Kong, Macau and other economies in the Asian production network was announced
in July 2009. By December 2010, some estimates suggest that over 60 thousand companies
have settled trade in the Yuan.
Trade settlement agreements have been routed through banks. In 2010, Bank of China's
total volume of Yuan-denominated cross-border trade settlement reached about 510 billion
Yuan ($77.6 bn). Industrial and Commercial Bank of China reported 150 billion Yuan in
trade settlement business over the July 2009 to March 2011 period. A survey by HSBC
reported that about 30% of cross-border trade of small and medium size companies in HK
in 2010 was settled in Yuan.1
In another round of reforms, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) announced that
non-nancial corporations from China will be allowed to issue Yuan-denominated bonds
in Hong Kong in February 2010. The rst year of Yuan-denominated bonds totalled 17.5
billion Yuan, with Yuan denominated deposits growing vefold from a year earlier to 407.7
billion Yuan.2
A mechanism through which cross-country spillovers of exchange rate policy could arise is
rooted in the rise of complex production chains in Asia, centred in China. China is now
the nerve centre of a complex and large production chain, where elements of economic
activity take place across Asia (Branson and Healy, 2005; Zhang, 2008). The initiatives in
recent years may have in
uenced the extent to which contracts within the Asian production
network are denominated in the Yuan. To the extent that invoicing relationships in the
Asian production chain is expressed in the US Dollar or other international currencies,
exchange rate policy in China does not in
uence other Asian economies. However, if (say)
a Malaysian producer sells into China with invoicing in Chinese Renminbi, then this creates
an interest in stability of the MYR-CNY exchange rate on the part of this producer. If
there is a suciently large mass of such producers, the Malaysian authorities may come to
desire a reduction in the volatility of the MYR-CNY exchange rate.
This suggests that two kinds of motivations might encourage an LDC or an EM to take
heed of Chinese exchange rate policy: concerns about export competitiveness, and Yuan-
denominated international transactions either in the private or in the public sector.
To the extent that (say) the Malaysian authorities are concerned about export competitive-
ness, they are more likely to appreciate the MYR/USD exchange rate when the CNY/USD
exchange rate has appreciated. And to the extent that the Malaysian authorities are con-
cerned about achieving low volatility of the CNY/MYR exchange rate, they would adjust
1Sources: http://goo.gl/CVZtd; http://goo.gl/bo1JU
2Bloomberg, as on 22, April 2011.
6the MYR/USD exchange rate alongside changes in the CNY/USD exchange rate.
While China has made an impressive start on the problem of Yuan internationalisation,
many critical elements of an international currency are absent in China. The Yuan is
perhaps decades away from becoming a serious alternative to the US dollar, Euro, British
Pound and the Japanese Yen(Lee, 2010b). The currency distribution of global foreign
exchange market turnover suggests that the US dollar remains the dominant currency (at
84.9%) with the Euro as the distant second (at 39.1%). The Yuan's role fell from 0.7% in
2007 to 0.3% in 2010.3 A paper by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange Taskforce4
lists various steps that the Chinese authorities could take to potentially accelerate Yuan
internationalisation. Factors such as Value Added Tax (VAT) rebate restrictions, and
foreign exchange control have been identied by the authorities as important steps forward.
Further, strengthening the range of domestic nancial services is also seen as an important
stepping stone for an international Yuan.
To the extent that such reforms have a direct bearing upon the role of China's exchange
policy in the exchange rate arrangements of other economies, it could have signicant
global ramications. It is in this perspective that an examination of the Yuan's role since
2005 gains signicance. Specically, in this paper, we ask three questions:
1. Which currencies in the world care about the Yuan?
2. Is there an East Asian bloc where the Yuan matters?
3. How large are these eects?
While two kinds of motivations may shape the thinking of economies in taking heed of
Chinese exchange rate policy, our goal is to measure the overall role of China in the
exchange rate regime, in East Asia and elsewhere. We do not seek to disentangle the two
factors.
2.1 Larger implications
An understanding of these questions is interesting from the viewpoint of understanding in-
ternational currencies, Asian production networks, Yuan internationalisation, and the role
of China in the world economy. While there are many aspects to international currencies
and Yuan internationalisation, in this paper we concretely measure one dimension: the
role of a country in the exchange rate regime outcomes of other economies.
In addition, the extent to which such phenomena are at work is of importance in the
debate about global imbalances. Some economists and governments believe that a Yuan
appreciation would help increase global aggregate demand. There are two channels through
3Since two currencies are involved in any transaction, the percentage mentioned here are on 200 and
not on 100. Source: Bank of International Settlements (2010), Table 3.
4'The use of renminbi for trade and non-trade denomination and settlement'
7Table 2 Current account surpluses: China and other parts of Asia
(Per cent of World GDP)
China Newly Industrialised Developing
Asia Asia
2001 0.05 0.15 0.12
2005 0.35 0.17 0.37
2008 0.74 0.14 0.71
Source: World Economic Outlook database
which this would work. First, it would have a direct impact upon the Chinese current
account surplus. In addition, to the extent that some other economies also appreciate in
response to a Chinese appreciation, this would yield an additional impact.
Table 2 shows that in 2008, the Chinese current account surplus was 0.74 per cent of
world GDP. However, the remainder of Asia had a current account surplus adding up to
0.85 per cent of world GDP. Appreciation in China would have a certain impact upon the
Chinese current account surplus. However, if other Asian economies would also appreciate,
in response to a Chinese appreciation, then the potential impact upon global aggregate
demand is potentially larger. In this case, Chinese exchange rate policy is an important
element of global macroeconomic policy. If, alternatively, we nd that other economies
are not greatly in
uenced by Chinese exchange rate regime choices, then Chinese exchange
rate regime reform would have a more muted signicance for the world at large.
3 Methodology
Our work supplements Ito (2010) and Lee (2010b). Both Ito (2010) and Lee (2010b)
measure internationalisation as the percentage of world reserves denominated in the Yuan
and using simulations project likely scenarios in 2035. In doing so, Lee (2010b) suggests
that the Yuan has the potential to move from about 3% to 12% of international reserves by
2035. We oer specic estimation strategies and a measure of Yuan's role in the exchange
rate arrangement of economies across the world.
Table 1 shows the time-series of the CNY/USD exchange rate. On 22 July 2005, the
Chinese departed from the xed-but-adjustable rate to the USD which had prevailed until
then. Hence, in this analysis, we only focus on the data following this reform. Weekly
percentage changes in the CNY/USD exchange rate prove to be near-zero until October
2005. Hence, the analysis of this paper starts in October and not July 2005. Over this
period, we see a certain variability in the exchange rate, which can potentially support
estimation of the spillovers on other currencies.
A natural starting point for this analysis is the exchange rate regression (Haldane and
Hall, 1991; Frankel and Wei, 1994). In this approach, an independent currency, such as
the Swiss Franc (CHF), is chosen as an arbitrary `numeraire'. If estimation involving the
8Figure 1 The Yuan exchange rate arrangement

































9Figure 2 Squared weekly orthogonalised Yuan returns





























































































This model can be extended to have an explanatory variable CNY/CHF, where a 6 param-
eter would pickup the extent to which the Malaysian authorities respond to a unit change
in the CNY/CHF exchange rate. A number of studies have attempted to extract the role
of the Yuan in the exchange rate arrangements of other currencies using this methodology
and have also pointed to the shortcomings of this approach (Ito, 2008; Ma and McCauley,
2010). One of the main problems this approach would suer is that of multicollinearity:
the high correlation between the percentage changes in the USD/CHF and CNY/CHF
exchange rates. As an example, from 2005 to 2010, weekly percentage changes in these
two currencies had a correlation of 0.988.
Hence, we rst orthogonalise the CNY/CHF exchange rate with respect to the USD/CHF



















. This time-series is plotted in Figure 2.5 With this in hand, an augmented
exchange rate regression can be considered:
































This regression would yield estimates of ^ 6, the impact of a unit change in the orthogo-
nalised Yuan upon the MYR/CHF exchange rate. Some economies may ignore the Yuan,
while other economies may have positive values for 6. There is no economic logic in favour
of a negative coecient (i.e. a country which depreciates when the Chinese appreciate).
Hence, we use a one-tailed test when judging the statistical signicance of 6.
This regression suers from the problem of structural change. Economies are known to
change their exchange rate regime, either in terms of shifting the weights , or in terms
of the 
exibility which is parametrised in this model through . In addition, changes
in currency market outcomes can come about through changes in external shocks. As an
example, tests of structure change in the exchange rate regression for Asian economies Pat-
naik, Shah, Sethy, and Balasubramaniam (2011) nd there has been signicant structural
change in all economies. In order to address this problem, we draw on the the inferential
strategy for measuring and classifying the exchange rate regime of Zeileis, Shah, and Pat-
naik (2010). This yields estimates of dates of structural change, which lead on to ^ 6 within
each sub-period.
In order to assess the usefulness of this strategy, and to obtain intuition into the method-
ology, we rst examine three examples. The rst example is that of the Hong Kong dollar,
which is a hard peg to the USD. For this case, the estimation strategy should consistently
yield ^ 6  0. The second example is that of the Malaysian Rinngit. This is of interest
because on 22 July 2005, when the Chinese announced a change in exchange rate policy,
the Malaysians immediately followed suit. The third example is that of a large exporting
nation which competes with China in labour-intensive exports: India. Here, exchange rate
policy might have exhibited concerns about the Yuan.
Hong Kong Hong Kong is a currency board, a hard peg to the USD. Hence, we expect
the coecient 6 to always be near 0. Table 3 shows the results of our estimation
strategy. It portrays two structural breaks, with small but statistically signicant
changes in the USD coecient. Across all these three periods, the CNYo coecient
is near zero.
Malaysia On 22 July 2005, when the Chinese announced a shift in their exchange rate
regime, the Malaysian authorities followed suit. Our estimation strategy applied to
(Funke and Gronwald, 2008; Frankel, 2009; Goldstein and Lardy, 2009; Fidrmuc, 2010; Patnaik, Shah,
Sethy, and Balasubramaniam, 2011). However, the dierence in the time series of CNYo
CHF when such struc-
tural breaks are taken into account are hardly discernible { an empirical estimation that is commented on
by Crockett (2008).
11Table 3 A pure peg to the US dollar: Hong Kong
Start date End date R2 USD ... CNYo Variance
2005-10-14 2009-03-20 1.00 1.00 ... -0.01 0.00
(77.93) ... (-0.22)
2009-03-27 2009-12-11 1.00 0.99 ... -0.02 0.00
(175.68) ... (-0.59)
2009-12-18 2011-02-11 1.00 1.01 ... 0.00 0.00
(38.91) ... (0.01)
Table 4 The role of the CNY in the Malaysian Ringgit
Start Date End Date R2 USD ... CNYo Variance
2005-10-14 2007-06-01 0.89 1.23 ... 1.13 0.13
(5.31) ... (2.89)
2007-06-08 2011-01-14 0.71 1.01 ... 0.22 0.56
(9.28) ... (0.87)
Malaysia, yields results (Table 4) that are consistent with this. For the rst period,
which runs till 1 June 2007, the point estimate for 6 is 1.13 and H0 : 6 = 1 cannot
be rejected. In other words, for each 1% appreciation by the Chinese, the Malaysians
appreciated by roughly the same amount.
However, this exchange rate regime was abandoned on 8 June 2007, where the
Malaysian authorities simultaneously dropped the 6 to zero, and increased 
exi-
bility, with the regression R2 going down from 0.89 to 0.71.
This analysis thus shows that there were spillovers of Chinese exchange rate policy
into Malaysia from 2005 till 2007, but not thereafter.
India India exports labour-intensive manufacturing, and it can be argued that the au-
thorities should be concerned about export competitiveness. Our analysis reveals
a period, until 16 March 2007, when there was a small 6 coecient with a point
estimate of 0.86, and a t statistic of 1.67 which is signicant using a one-tailed test.
On 23 March 2007, India had a structural break in the exchange rate regime, shifting
towards greater 
exibility. The regression R2 went down from 0.86 to 0.60. As a part
of this reform, the role of Yuan was extinguished.
These three examples encourage us about the usefulness of this estimation strategy. It
is then applied across 132 economies. For each country, a set of structural breaks are
identied, and then a 6 coecient is identied within each of these sub-periods.
In examining this large set of results, seeking statistically signicant values of 6, there is
a possibility of data-mining bias. Even if H0 : 6 = 0 were always true, if 100 tests are
conducted, on average there would be ve rejections at a 95% level of signicance. Hence,
the frequency of rejection should be compared against the size of the test in assessing
whether the results merely re
ect data mining.
12Table 5 The Indian rupee
Start Date End Date R2 USD ... CNYo Variance
2005-10-14 2007-03-16 0.86 1.28 ... 0.86 0.18
(4.30) ... (1.67)
2007-03-23 2011-02-25 0.60 1.37 ... 0.10 1.04
(9.33) ... (0.27)
Table 6 Where did the Yuan ever matter (post-2005)?
Angola Argentina Bosnia and Herzegovina Burundi
Bolivia Belarus Algeria Estonia
Eritrea Fiji Ethiopia Gibraltar
Honduras Israel India Kuwait
Libya Madagascar Macedonia Maldives
Oman Pakistan Serbia Saudi Arabia
Sierra Leone Suriname Seychelles Sao Tome and Principe
Tunisia Tanzania Taiwan Viet Nam
Indonesia
4 Results
We analyse a total of 132 currencies of the world. This analysis reveals 375 currency-
periods. Of these, there are 85 signicant coecients for the Yuan. This rejection rate, of
22.66%, well exceeds the size of the test. These results are also consistent with the ndings
by Chen and Cheung (2011) that the current role of Yuan is quite small.
4.1 A Yuan bloc?
Table 6 shows the economies where, in the post-2005 period, there was even one sub-period
where the Yuan coecient was signicant at a 95% level of signicance. Detailed results
for these currency-periods, where the Yuan mattered, are presented in Appendix A. This
reveals an interesting footprint of Chinese exchange rate policy, in some large developing
economies (e.g. India), many economies in Africa, some close allies (e.g. Pakistan) and
even one OECD country (Israel).
In seven of the thirty-four economies for which the Yuan is signicant, gross trade with
the USA is higher than that with China. For the rest, China is one of the biggest gross
(and net) trading partner and surpasses that with the USA. Table 7 presents one of the
two underlying channels of in
uence: trade relationship with China for a sample set of
economies. The other channel of in
uence, export competitiveness, is also likely to have
played a role in all these economies. For instance, although China is India's largest gross
trading partner, it competes with China on export of certain goods and services to common
destinations such as Europe and North America.
13Table 7 Gross trade with China and USA
per cent of total gross trade
2001 2010
China USA China USA
Angola 9.25 33.21 37.22 22.37
Argentina 8.18 13.18 14.14 8.89
Ethiopa 5.48 5.84 18.82 5.83
Belarus 0.64 1.41 3.61 0.76
India 3.44 13.69 11.56 9.40
Kuwait 3.22 12.06 10.75 11.11
Libya 0.44 0.25 10.25 4.87
Madagascar 4.10 14.27 15.79 5.22
Oman 5.42 4.79 19.47 2.88
Pakistan 4.41 15.92 15.77 9.95
Saudi Arabia 4.49 18.72 13.62 12.66
Sierra Leone 4.06 5.89 10.17 8.12
Tanzania 3.04 2.56 20.75 2.50
Indonesia 4.56 12.54 13.57 8.05
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics.
Table 8 To whom does the Yuan matter in East Asia?
Start Date End Date R2 USD CNY Variance
Malaysia
2005-10-14 2007-06-11 0.89 1.23 1.13 0.13
(5.31) (9.28)
Taiwan
2005-10-14 2011-02-11 0.83 1.03 0.45 0.26
(14.23) (2.67)
Viet Nam
2009-10-16 2011-02-11 0.71 0.82 1.39 0.72
(3.90) (2.51)
4.2 An East Asian Yuan bloc?
For this analysis, we dene East Asia as: Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, South Korea,
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam. When our estimation strategy is
applied to these 9 economies, 23 currency-periods are identied. Of these, there are three
situations where the CNYo coecient is signicant using a 95% level of signicance. This
rejection rate of H0 : 6 = 0, of 13%, exceeds the size of the test.
As seen in Table 8, the Malaysian exchange rate regime involved a role for the Yuan, but
this ended in June 2007. In Viet Nam's case, from 16 October 2009 onwards, there is a
statistically signicant 6. Here also, the null hypothesis of H0 : 6 = 1 cannot be rejected,
so we can say that the Viet Namese authorities appreciate by 1% for each 1 percentage
point appreciation in China. Finally, the Taiwanese exchange rate regime has not had any
structural break through this period, and the point estimate for 6 is 0.45.
14Figure 3 GDP-weighted CNY coecient

































Ordering these events in time, we see that in October 2005, Taiwan and Malaysia both
cared about the Yuan. In June 2007, the Malaysians stepped away from the Yuan. In
October 2009, the Viet Namese initiated a role for the Yuan in their exchange rate regime.
Thus, in February 2011, two of the nine economies of Asia had a role for the Yuan in their
exchange rate regime.
4.3 What is the magnitude of the role of the Yuan?
In order to obtain a summary statement about the role of the Yuan in international ex-
change rate arrangements, at each point in time, we compute the GDP-weighted average
of the ^ 6 for all economies. Bootstrap inference is used to construct the 95% condence
interval for this estimate.
These results are shown in Figure 3. They show a period from 2006 to 2008, where the
overall average coecient was teetering into signicance. However, by early 2008, many
structural breaks appear to have taken place in exchange rate regimes. From early 2008
onwards, the overall GDP-weighted average coecient for CNYo is indistinguishable from
zero.
Given that the economies with the biggest GDPs in the world tend to have 
oating exchange
rates, we turn to the set of emerging markets and LDCs. This analysis is shown in Figure
4. Here also, we see that from early 2006 till late 2007, there was statistical signicance in
the GDP-weighted Yuan coecient. But from early 2008 onwards, this has subsided.
Finally, Figure 4 focuses only on Asia. Here, it appears that from mid-2006 onwards, there
has been statistical signicance, other than a crisis interlude in which this was interrupted.
At the same time, the developments on Yuan internationalisation from 2009 onwards have
not, as yet, led to a change in the role of the Yuan in the Asian exchange rate arrangement.
15Figure 4 The CNY in EMs and LDCs

































Figure 5 The CNY in Asia


































The emergence of China as a very large economy, with a very high trade/GDP ratio, has
led many observers to expect that the Yuan will become a major international currency. In
recent years, the Chinese authorities have undertaken signicant moves on Yuan interna-
tionalisation, with the establishment of payments mechanisms for Yuan settlement, swap
lines in Yuan, and controlled convertibility with Hong Kong.
In this paper, we have utilised recent advances in measurement of the exchange rate regime
in order to measure one dimension of Yuan internationalisation: the role of the Yuan in
global exchange rate regimes.
Our results suggest that the role of the Yuan in the exchange rate arrangements of other
currencies was signicant when the Yuan was not pegged to the USD. As many as 34
currencies were in
uenced by the Chinese exchange rate. However, with the reinstatement
of the peg to the dollar in 2008, the role of the Yuan declined.
Throughout the period of analysis, the footprint in East Asia has been small and restricted
to Malaysia (between October 2005 and June 2007), Taiwan (throughout) and Viet Nam
(October 2009 till date). In February 2011, at the end of the dataset, the role of the
Yuan was relatively modest. While the null hypothesis of zero can be rejected, the GDP-
weighted coecient of the autonomous movements in the Yuan in Asia is small. The
GDP-weighted coecient is roughly zero when computed at the level of LDCs and EMs
and when computed for the entire world.
These results must also be viewed in the context of small movements in the Yuan-Dollar
rate in the recent period. The Yuan may have decades to go before it gains economic
signicance as an internationalised currency and the process, as Lee (2010b) concludes, may
be systematic and drawn out. However, as our analysis shows, a large number of economies
in the world have cared about the Yuan despite small movements in the Yuan-Dollar rate
since 2005. Though the magnitude of Yuan's role in the exchange rate arrangements
of economies across the world has been subdued, it could potentially rise with greater

exibility in the Yuan-Dollar rate.
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Table 9: Who cared about the Chinese Yuan?
Start Date End Date R2 USD CNY Variance
Republic of Angola
2006-11-24 2007-05-18 0.71 0.85 6.24 0.79
(0.71) (3.29)
People's Democratic Republic of Algeria
2008-10-17 2009-04-10 0.59 1.67 4.43 3.85
(2.67) (1.79)
Argentine Republic
2005-10-14 2008-09-05 0.90 0.98 0.33 0.18
(7.20) (1.68)
2008-09-12 2009-04-10 0.84 1.28 2.63 0.97
(4.59) (2.31)
Republic of Belarus
2007-12-28 2008-11-14 1.00 1.01 0.11 0.01
(36.12) (2.12)
Plurinational State of Bolivia
2007-06-15 2009-06-12 0.97 1.10 0.35 0.10
(16.82) (2.41)
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
2005-10-14 2008-08-08 0.61 1.15 0.78 0.56
(4.53) (2.17)
Republic of Burundi
2009-10-16 2011-02-25 0.96 1.00 0.45 0.08
(14.85) (2.51)
Western African Franc
2007-04-20 2007-12-07 1.00 1.97 0.05 0.00
(97.14) (2.00)
2008-07-04 2009-01-30 0.92 1.87 0.80 0.13
(15.27) (2.42)
2009-02-06 2011-02-25 0.99 1.96 0.20 0.01
(95.53) (3.33)
Central African Republic
2008-02-01 2009-01-30 0.93 1.97 0.45 0.10
(23.27) (2.36)
Republic of Estonia
2005-10-14 2010-01-08 0.96 2.00 0.11 0.02
(71.06) (1.82)
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
2009-01-09 2010-02-26 0.47 1.33 8.54 2.11
(2.23) (1.87)
Republic of the Fiji Islands
2005-10-14 2008-10-03 0.63 1.65 0.75 0.52
(7.66) (2.27)
French Polynesia
2005-10-14 2009-05-08 0.37 1.82 0.92 1.19
(8.70) (2.08)
20Republic of Honduras
2009-02-06 2009-10-02 1.00 0.99 0.21 0.00
(157.92) (3.78)
Republic of India
2005-10-14 2007-03-16 0.86 1.28 0.86 0.18
(4.30) (1.67)
State of Israel
2005-10-14 2007-12-07 0.63 2.45 1.51 0.66
(6.27) (2.55)
State of Kuwait
2007-05-25 2008-10-03 0.96 1.02 0.28 0.07
(9.99) (1.86)
2008-10-10 2009-04-03 0.92 1.03 1.45 0.39
(5.43) (1.90)
Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
2005-10-14 2011-02-25 0.71 1.31 0.45 0.62
(12.00) (1.72)
The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
2005-10-14 2008-07-04 0.62 1.43 0.69 0.40
(6.51) (2.21)
Republic of Madagascar
2005-10-14 2008-09-05 0.48 1.12 0.81 0.86
(3.75) (1.87)
Republic of Maldives
2007-06-01 2011-02-25 1.00 0.99 0.04 0.00
(140.44) (2.58)
Sultanate of Oman
2010-01-29 2011-02-25 1.00 1.00 0.04 0.00
(211.64) (3.01)
Islamic Republic of Pakistan
2007-12-28 2008-11-21 0.73 1.57 2.15 1.78
(3.52) (2.32)
Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe
2008-02-15 2009-03-27 1.00 1.00 0.10 0.00
(69.86) (2.68)
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
2008-09-26 2009-06-26 1.00 0.96 0.13 0.00
(60.00) (2.06)
Republic of Serbia
2005-10-14 2006-06-23 0.68 3.41 2.14 0.17
(5.59) (2.06)
Republic of Seychelles
2007-10-12 2008-08-08 1.00 1.04 0.14 0.01
(23.25) (2.12)
Republic of Sierra Leone
2005-10-14 2006-04-07 0.99 1.10 0.75 0.02
(4.76) (1.68)
Republic of Suriname
2005-10-14 2006-04-07 0.99 1.10 0.75 0.02
(4.76) (1.68)
21Taiwan, Province of China
2005-10-14 2011-02-25 0.83 1.05 0.45 0.27
(14.57) (2.64)
United Republic of Tanzania
2005-10-14 2007-10-05 0.56 0.27 2.06 0.94
(0.50) (2.49)
Republic of Tunisia
2008-10-10 2011-02-25 0.82 1.54 0.44 0.20
(20.47) (1.93)
Socialist Republic of Viet Nam
2009-10-16 2011-02-25 0.72 0.84 1.36 0.71
(4.05) (2.49)
22